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This paper aims to highlight the importance of addressing both competitive strategy and business model for the long-term success of a company. The paper builds a prescriptive framework to help managers assess their companies’ positions based on the extent to which they attend to their strategies and business models simultaneously. In doing so, the paper offers four possible outcomes – idling, faceoff, breakdown and traction – providing examples to capture each scenario and managerial prescription.

The framework of this study is based on academic research in strategy and business model design, the authors’ scholarly work on innovation and their combined experiences and observations in the industry. The framework uses examples of well-known companies to make the case for why managers need to pay heed to both business models and strategies simultaneously to achieve long-term competitive profitability.

This study’s framework suggests that the delicate balance between strategy and business model design determines the long-term competitive advantage and profitability of a company. Focusing on strategy without paying heed to the business model can cause companies to lose sight of changing customer behaviors. Alternatively, managerial attention to business models at the exclusion of its strategy leaves the company vulnerable to competition. The framework points at the delicate strategy–business model balance required to manage winning companies.

Business models and strategies represent two separate yet inextricably linked domains under the purview of management. However, companies can be weakened because of an overemphasis on one at the expense of the other. This paper’s framework offers a simple yet effective guide to assist managers in assessing their organizations’ current positions while also providing direction toward addressing any shortcomings.

The purpose of this chapter is to reconsider the five principles of Elder et al.'s (2003) life course theory while centering disability status as an axis of inequality. We use existing research from the fields of the sociology of disability, disability studies, and aging and the life course to reflect on ways in which each life course principle can better attend to the experiences of disabled people. We start with the principle of time and place and discuss how cohort and period effects facilitate a deeper understanding of disabled people's experiences historically. Next, we analyze the principle of timing with an emphasis on cumulative dis/advantage to establish how disability status is an axis of inequality that contributes to the accumulation of social disadvantage and intersects with other axes of inequality (e.g., race, class, and gender). Then, we discuss the two principles of agency and linked lives and employ the concept of “bounded agency” to describe how ableism limits the agency of disabled people. Finally, we examine the principle of life-span development and discuss how adaptation and resilience are contextual and an ordinary part of human experiences. We conclude by offering recommendations for both life course and disability scholars to consider in hopes of broadening our theoretical and empirical knowledge about the lives of disabled people at every stage of the life course and the mechanisms by which resources are stratified by disability and age.

Despite the episodic pervasiveness of recessions and their destructive impact on firms, a void exists in the management literature examining the intersection between recessions, strategy, and performance. This paper seeks directly to address this research void by reviewing relevant literature spanning the past 20 years and building an integrative framework for future research efforts.

The paper systematically reviews and compartmentalizes articles on the intersection between firm strategy and economic recession published between 1991 and 2010 in widely recognized management and entrepreneurship journals. Concurrently, a theoretical framework is proposed which identifies distinct constructs and linkages related to economic recessions, strategy, and performance.

The findings are twofold. First, the review distils disparate scholarly works on firm behavior and recessions to provide a systematic appraisal and review of what people know and do not know about managing firms through economic downturn. Second, the conceptual framework points to numerous opportunities to scholars interested in conducting research on this timely and important topic.

The paper answers a call by scholars for research that fills a void on systematic diagnosis, prescription, or prophylaxis that can guide managers through recessions.

This paper represents the only research initiative to systematically bring a comprehensive overview of firm strategy in the context of recessionary environments. In effect, it addresses the larger research question: “What do we know about the interplay between firm strategy and recession?”

The purpose of this paper is to compare the governance structures of two distinctive governance forms: the family firm and the leveraged buyout (LBO). The paper also explores the relative performance of these two organizational forms over the course of the economic business cycle.

The paper provides a theoretical treatment of the family firm and the LBO using the stewardship perspective and agency theory. The analysis anticipates the board structure for each organizational form and relates family firm and LBO governance to performance over the business cycle.

From a conceptual treatment, the family‐owned concern exhibits board characteristics reflecting the longer‐term orientation of the firm, with boards empowered to include non‐economic, as well as economic, goals. LBOs are structured to maximize shareholder value over a shorter time horizon. LBOs may take advantage of expansionary environments whereas family firms may be better prepared for economic down‐cycles.

The paper takes a holistic approach to contrasting two organizational forms that fit their respective theoretical frames and compares some of their more salient governance characteristics and performance over the business cycle.

Managers and boards can structure governance to manage the business cycle. Stakeholders can selectively engage firms that portray vital governance characteristics for their benefit and may also pressure boards and top management to make necessary governance improvements.

The paper offers an introductory comparison between family firms and LBOs in terms of governance and managing the firm over the business cycle. This paper makes the case that some organizational forms are better suited to certain types of economic climates.

This paper seeks to give consideration to the family imprint on governance in the context of firms experiencing economic recession. It aims to rely on agency and stewardship theories to empirically examine the relationship between CEO duality and slack resources on family firm performance during economic recession.

Trend analyses were used employing hierarchical linear modeling (HLM) to evaluate the influence of duality and slack resources on the performance of 75 family‐controlled public firms (FCPFs) during the 2001‐2002 US economic recession and recovery.

The results indicate that duality and slack by themselves do not influence firm performance. However, family firms with a combined CEO‐chair and ample slack resources experience enhanced performance both at the onset of recession and at its conclusion. The findings suggest that a unified leadership and access to slack provide the family with the means to weather economic hardship. The paper makes the case that the stewardship afforded by this combination provides clear benefits to outside shareholders.

The absolute leadership and decision‐making control afforded to a CEO‐chair who also holds the reins over firm resources helps to favorably position the business and ease its course through difficult times. The results of this paper suggest that what is good for the family may also be good for other stakeholders in the firm, in this case non‐family shareholders.

With this study, attention is drawn to the governance of family businesses during times of economic duress. To the authors' knowledge, this study represents the only empirical investigation into family firm governance within this unique, albeit prevalent context.

This paper aims to introduce a supplementary strategic mapping tool designed specifically for family businesses. The authors extend the popular tool of strategy maps into the family business arena to address potential misalignments arising from the family imprint on a business. The resulting family enterprise strategy map (FESM) aims, both literally and figuratively, to get internal stakeholders on the same page in their pursuit of family business objectives. Using the FESM, family managers can enhance strategy design and implementation, thereby increasing the viability and longevity of their enterprises for future generations.

The framework draws from previous work on strategic maps, from scholarly research on family businesses and from the authors’ experiences consulting with family enterprises. The framework addresses four distinct but interrelated perspectives requiring managerial attention: family business objectives, family alignment, family systems and family business foundation. The case of Mondavi Winery is used to illustrate the prescriptive value of the FESM.

The FESM is meant to be used cooperatively among internal stakeholders to tease out potential challenges that can hinder the effective design and implementation of a family business strategy. The FESM makes explicit the primary objectives of the family business, prompts stakeholders to voice professional and personal ambitions in the business and brings individual risk propensities to the dialogue. Systems and activities necessary for successful strategy implementation are also underlined in the FESM. Lastly, the framework helps to identify the strategic foundation that can be leveraged to achieve the family enterprise’s objective.

The value of the FESM is threefold. First, having family members and non-family managers engage in this activity can make known individual, family and non-family functions, desires and goals. In doing so, the FESM also effectively highlights misalignments among and between various internal stakeholders that may otherwise go unnoticed. Second, the FESM draws management’s attention to specific family-related resources and capabilities within the company and, just as importantly, those that need to be cultivated to achieve strategic objectives. Third, the FESM can serve as a valuable reminder during those times when family systems begin to malfunction or to diverge from intended objectives.

This study aims to examine the governance structure of the firm undergoing a complete buyout cycle (reverse leveraged buyout). Its purpose is to empirically explore the evolution of corporate board structures as a unique source of value creation, in addition to the agency mechanisms of the discipline of debt and incentives of equity participation.

The authors rely on agency theory and the resource dependence perspective to develop sets of hypotheses that examine changes in the board composition of 65 R‐LBOs and 65 matched continuing firms spanning a 25‐year period (1979‐2004).

The empirical results reveal numerous insights about why R‐LBOs go private, to what extent boards restructure during the buyout phase, and how those changes relate to firm performance. Taken together, the findings give strong credence to the argument that boards represent a supplemental source of value creation in the buyout process.

For scholars, the study presents a platform for further inquiry into the role of boards of directors in R‐LBOs as well as the inclusion of resource dependence theory to inform on the phenomenon.

The study helps to address this new source of value creation for practical interest. It offers a benchmark for buyout firms to compare their board characteristics by establishing linkages between pre‐buyout deficiencies, post‐buyout modifications, and post‐SIPO performance.

The results shift scholarly attention away from the structural governance tools to the group dynamics of the board. The findings call into question the restricted attention given by buyout researchers to leverage and ownership as value drivers by prompting a closer evaluation of the relationship between buyout board structures and related structuring of debt and managerial equity participation. Furthermore, the inclusion of the resource‐dependency perspective alongside agency theory as an explanatory theory allows for a richer account of the LBO phenomenon and its sources of value creation.

In this paper, the authors aim to build a prescriptive framework to help managers in turning around their ailing organizations. Their framework focuses on the extent of contractionary and expansionary initiatives needed to rebuild long‐term competitive advantage. They make the case that managers engaging in a pro‐active and balanced approach to scaling down and growing their organizations can boost the success of their recovery efforts.

The authors build their framework based on academic research on corporate turnarounds, their scholarly work on corporate restructuring, and their combined experiences and observations in industry. Their framework proposes four possible outcomes of the turnaround process: comeback, adrift, running‐on‐empty, and collapse. They provide examples to describe each outcome.

The authors' framework suggests that the interaction between two restructuring actions – retrenchment and repositioning ‐ determines the outcome of corporate turnarounds. By overemphasizing downsizing, managers fail to jumpstart entrepreneurial growth that can propel the firm towards long‐term competitive advantage. Similarly, stresses arising from excessive growth programs can quickly drain firm resources. As such, all managers need to assess the alignment between downsizing efforts and growth‐oriented initiatives. By bringing awareness to the interdependency between retrenchment and repositioning, the authors' framework can guide managers in making necessary adjustments on the way to fixing their organization.

Retrenchment and repositioning represent the means available to managers attempting corporate turnaround. However, corporate turnarounds often fail due to an overemphasis on one phase of the restructuring process, at the expense of the other. This framework points to the delicate retrenchment‐repositioning required to achieve successful turnaround.

In this paper, the authors build a prescriptive framework for managers to help assess potential shifts in consumer behavior during economic recession. The framework offers a guide to help evaluate the extent of customer attrition risks, and to devise customer‐centric strategies to stabilize businesses in light of recessionary demand shocks.

The framework is built based on insights gained from surveying approximately 500 small, medium‐sized, and large businesses during the 2001‐2002 and 2007‐present recession. The executives surveyed worked in a wide array of industries, at organizations that varied in size from one person to thousands of employees.

The framework suggests that the interaction between two consumer behavior dynamics – lock‐in and utility specificity – determines the extent of customer retention and attrition to businesses experiencing recession. As such, all organizations need to assess the likelihood that their customers will alter their purchases in response to recessionary pressures. The authors provide measures to help managers anticipate shifts in buying behavior and formulate appropriate responses for customer retention and acquisition.

Research on effective management strategies for coping with recessions remains one of the most important but nevertheless overlooked areas in strategic management. In most instances, prescriptions fall under two broad categories – i.e. seek out inefficiencies and reduce costs. The authors contend that for companies to successfully navigate recessionary environments they need to reach beyond efficiency measures to also adopt strategies minimizing customer loss during the recession and luring back buyers post‐recession. The authors offer insights to help managers evaluate customer acquisition and retention recession.

The purpose of the study is to explore the board of directors in leveraged buyouts (LBOs) as a distinct source of value creation and to conceptually investigate the going‐private transaction via LBO as a response to deficient governance structures as well as the post‐buyout board restructuring.

The paper provides a review of the literature on LBOs boards, and relies on agency theory and the resource dependence perspective to develop testable propositions. The work suggests that the board as a particular source of efficiency gains in LBOs warrants further empirical research.

The paper gives strong credence to the argument that boards represent a unique source of value creation in LBOs. Previous agency‐theoretic work is complemented by focusing on the monitoring function of the board, but resource dependence theory introduced to suggest the importance of a strategic service and support function. The work is conceptual in nature and thus requires subsequent empirical testing to verify assertions set forth in this study.

The paper shows that incentives of managerial equity participation and the discipline of debt are gradually losing their distinctiveness in today's buyout industry. To compete in an increasingly crowded environment, LBO specialists need to identify new sources of value to generate attractive returns for their investors.

The paper extends the existing LBO literature by introducing resource dependent as a complementary framework. Given that the traditional LBO literature examines the discipline of debt and managerial ownership that explain their efficiencies, the role of LBO boards as a distinct value creation mechanism in buyouts is introduced.